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Introduction 
Neither populism nor populist political communication has been the subject of systematic 
academic research in Portugal. The studies that address populism in a direct manner are 
scarce, and in the past, the expressions populist party, populist politician, and populist 
discourse have not been commonly used in the media and in national politics. In the last few 
years, however, the word populism, or expressions related to it, has increasingly become a 
favorite catchword for both politicians and the media. It may be that the use of the expression 
in the Portuguese political and media environments— in particular, by commentators—is 
simply a reflection of the expression’s common use across Europe in more recent years; or 
perhaps interest in the phenomenon is growing. If so, this apparent greater interest has not yet 
been translated into Portuguese academic literature. 
 
In addition, when these expressions are used, it is in a pejorative sense to criticize either the 
way in which politics is conducted (a policy orientation or a policy proposal, say) or a 
different style of political communication— which usually entails more direct ways of 
addressing voters, open demands for political and parliamentary reforms, and criticisms of the 
political system. Interestingly, the researchers who use the words populism or populist 
to designate a particular style of politics and a particular type of politician frequently link it to 
media prominence and visibility (for instance, Costa, 2011; Jalali, 2007; Vitorino & 
Fernandes, 2000). These assessments have not been further developed in research. 
 
Noteworthy usages of the word populism in the national media and politics appeared in 
descriptons of the 2014 Socialist Party primary (PS) (including, for instance, some reactions 
to António Seguro’s proposal to reduce the number of members of parliament) and to some 
recent Social Democratic Party (PSD) government proposals. The description was applied 
to some politicians who have appeared on the Portuguese political stage in recent years 
displaying different styles of communication and campaigning, including different forms of 
addressing the electorate, which can be seen as an attempt to capitalize on popular discontent. 
Such was the case of Fernando Nobre, 2011 presidential candidate (physician and president 
of a non-governmental organization), who promoted the self-image of an outsider, of being 
different from the other politicians. The same applies to Marinho e Pinto, current minister in 
the European Parliament and leader of a new political party, whose populist traits are further 
explained later in this chapter. 
 
Research on Populism in Portugal 
The words populism and populist are used here and there in some academic works, but 
usually in a general sense and not as the subject of research itself. Noteworthy studies that we 
found in our literature search (1995–2014, using titles and abstracts) made it clear that in the 
Portuguese research environment, populism is often equated with radical-right parties and 
discourses (Costa, 2008; Costa, 2011; Costa Pinto, 1995; Marchi, 2012, 2013; Rocha, 
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2012; Zúquete, 2007a), with some political leaders (including local leaders) (Jalali, 2007; 
Santos, 2008; Vitorino & Fernandes, 2000), and with a social movement (Mendes, 2004, 
2005). In addition, most Portuguese politicians and political parties that are somehow related 
to populism in the research exhibit some populist features but are usually not publicly 
identified as populist, unlike many of their foreign counterparts. 
 
Despite the small number of references found, it is possible to note some complexities, in 
particular in what seem to be apparently contradictory conceptualizations of populism. There 
are no empirical analyses of populism or of populist political communication, and very few 
explanatory attempts were found. This outcome seems to suggest that the issue has not been 
rigorously investigated in Portugal, at least not in the literature published in the national 
language, which means that further theoretical and empirical elaboration is required. 
 
Concerning the development of research on the concept of populism and the publication of 
work on this topic in Portugal, populism has not been often addressed directly as a subject per 
se; in the few instances that it had been studied, it was mainly discussed in the context of 
populist politicians or populist political parties, and conceptualizations proposed by other 
authors were applied. It should be noted, however, that the Portuguese researcher Zúquete 
(2007b, 2013) applied the concept of “missionary politics” to populism but did not focus 
specifically on Portuguese politics. Resorting to cases in Europe and South America, Zúquete 
developed the concept of missionary politics as a contemporary example of the sacralization 
of politics. His study demonstrated that missionary politics is a form of political religion led 
by charismatic leaders geared toward a mission of salvation: It transcends populism and goes 
beyond a mere identification with the people, offering an integrated view of the world. 
 
In the sample composed of studies published in Portuguese, there are thus no attempts to 
conceptualize populism or populist politics based on their particular manifestations in the 
national context and the specific traits of Portuguese politicians and politics. The theoretical 
framings most commonly used in the research published in Portuguese were proposed by 
Mény and Surel (2002), Merkl and Weinberg (2003), and Mudde (2000, 2007). For instance, 
Costa (2008) uses a definition from Merkl and Weinberg (2003), in which these authors 
explain how popular resentments and mistrust are mobilized against specific targets—usually 
the political elites and their official interpretations of events—with the objective of 
destabilizing their power. These strategies are most successful when there is a charismatic 
leader calling for political renewal and profound democratic reforms. 
 
Rocha (2012) frames his analysis through the ideological and rhetorical components of 
populism pointed out by Mudde (2007) and by Mény and Surel (2002). Mudde’s (2007) 
interpretation refers to populism as an ideological characteristic that justifies and potentiates 
the clear protest nature of populist politicians and parties, their anti-system positions, and calls 
for changes in the current organization of political power in liberal democracies. Mény and 
Surel (2002) see populism as “an empty shell, which can be filled and made meaningful by 
whatever is poured into it” (p. 6). More specifically, Rocha (2012) uses the expression to refer 
to a rhetorical political style aimed at mobilizing the electorate against the power structure 
and whose legitimacy is ultimately supported by the people and against the elites (p. 9). 
 
In Portugal, the expression populist politics has also been used by commentators in the 
context of local politics. A few local politicians, such as Fátima Felgueiras, Avelino Ferreira 
Torres, Isaltino Morais, and Valentim Loureiro, have been called populists. Following Jagers 
and Walgrave’s (2007) proposal, their type of populism could be classified as anti-elitism 
3 
 
populism. These local politicians have one other thing in common—they were all subjects of 
criminal investigations regarding corruption and misuse of political power. 
 
The sociologist Ruivo wrote opinion articles relating these politicians to populism and 
describing the consequences of such a style of politics; he did not, however, translate these 
short opinion pieces into academic research, nor did he publish any scholarly work focusing 
on these politicians and their populism. Ruivo (2005) relates the electoral success of these 
candidates to the way they have presented themselves as belonging to the people, with whom 
they have a direct relationship. Against the backdrop of growing disbelief in national political 
institutions, the personal and proximity dimensions are extremely important in local politics, 
and these candidates were perceived as being part of local identities and therefore belonging 
to the local people. Local identity is thus subsumed into the notion of political 
trust. 
 
Santos, one of Valentin Loureiro’s media advisers, wrote a book in 2008, which is more the 
result of practitioner insight than of academic research. It is, however, one of the few 
examples of a published work in Portugal that refers to populism directly, and it also 
addresses some of the electoral strategies of this highly visible local politician. Loureiro, a 
former military officer (a major in the army), was mayor of Gondomar and chairman of a 
football club and of the professional Portuguese football league for several years while 
accumulating other positions in companies such as the Metro do Porto. He was involved in a 
sports corruption scandal and found guilty of abuse of power. He is also known for his 
peculiar personal style and his distinctive electoral campaigns, which often included the offer 
of domestic appliances to the population. 
 
This book describes how Loureiro dealt with the press and journalists and explains some of 
his strategies to win popular support and votes. A different part is dedicated to some 
reflections on how the electoral victories of the so-called populist politicians (Loureiro, 
Morais, and Felgueiras) were interpreted and handled by their political parties of origin, the 
Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party (after the criminal lawsuits, they lost party 
support and ran as independent candidates). According to Santos (2008), contrary to 
expectations, these political parties have not tried to understand the reasons behind these 
victories, and instead, they have applied all their resources to preventing these candidates 
from running for office again. 
 
Jardim, the former president of the regional government of Madeira and an unusually long-
serving, democratically elected, political leader (having served from 1978 until he stepped 
down in 2015), has also been a recurrent example of a populist style of communication in 
Portugal. Yet, there are almost no references to this case study of populism in the academic 
literature. Magone (2004) refers to Jardim’s “charismatic populism,” linking it to 
“personalism” (p. 75), which is, according to him, an important feature of Portuguese politics, 
but the idea is not further developed or analyzed. 
 
Throughout the decades, this right-wing leader developed a discourse in which his 
government, and consequently the people of Madeira, were constantly under attack, whether 
by the political class of mainland Portugal (and its minions on the island), by the cultural and 
political left, or by the mainstream media. To further accentuate his separation from 
the political elites, Jardim always portrayed himself as a common man, using unadorned 
language, rude if necessary, and socializing freely with the citizens of Madeira. His leadership 
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is an example of anti-elitist populism, with occasional advances into excluding populism. 
However, even on the occasions when his populism could potentially be characterized 
as complete populism, some kind of gradation needs be included in the analysis because it is 
by no means similar to the complete populism of the National Renewal Party (PNR). 
 
There are mainly two parties that have been labeled populist in Portugal: the Democratic and 
Social Center–People’s Party (CDS-PP) and, most obviously, the National Renewal Party. In 
the case of CDS-PP, certain populist features of some of its leaders, namely Monteiro and 
Portas, both in political discourse and in policy proposals, have been pointed out occasionally 
in research (e.g., Vitorino & Fernandes, 2000; Jalali, 2007). However, these interpretations 
have not thus far been further developed through a focused approach in specific studies; in 
other words, these examples of populist features and populist political communication have 
not received in-depth academic attention. 
 
While analyzing the crisis of political representation in Portugal, Vitorino and Fernandes 
(2000) discussed some of the characteristics of the parliamentary political parties. They 
referred to an absence of strategy by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and to its 
popular discourse, which was being neutralized by “CDS-PP’s populism.” These authors 
mention the CDS- PP’s prominence in the media. Resorting to a populist style, Monteiro’s 
1990s leadership pushed forward the public debate on issues such as security, the 
reinforcement of social protection for national citizens, the primacy of national law, and 
national independence over any supranational projects. The politicization of these issues also 
involved the CDS-PP’s support for more restrictive immigration laws, more severe security 
policies, and a Euroskeptic platform (with a clear rejection of the project of a federal Europe). 
Under the leadership of Monteiro, CDS-PP’s populism occasionally veered into complete 
populism (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007); but here, too, some scale of populist features 
would be useful because Monteiro’s position was never as radical as the National Renewal 
Party’s extreme complete populism. 
 
After electoral losses and internal divisions and rivalries, Monteiro was replaced in the party’s 
leadership by Portas in 1996. Under the leadership of Portas, and after the 2002 legislative 
election, the integration of CDS-PP in a government coalition led the party to moderate its 
nationalist discourse and to realign its positioning toward European integration, even if Portas 
kept his distinctive and popular communication style. 
 
The other populist party pointed out by researchers (Costa, 2011; Marchi, 2012; Zúquete, 
2007a) is the National Renewal Party, which is a prime example of complete populism (Jagers 
and Walgrave, 2007). The National Renewal Party’s worldview is firmly anchored in a rigid 
dichotomy between the evil elites and the good (even if sometimes misguided) people. 
Focusing on the anti-systemic nature of the party, Zúquete (2007a) explains that its 
exceptionalism is a recurrent topic in the party’s discourse; it is the polarization between the 
party of the nation and the politicians of the system. “We, and only we,” the president Coelho 
explains, “courageously assume the struggle for national sovereignty and for the rights of the 
Portuguese”, and using a common expression of French nationalist Jean-Marie Le Pen, the 
National Renewal Party’s president vows to “say out loud what the people think in silence.” 
(Zúquete, 2007a, p. 185). The nation’s survival thus hinges upon awakening the rest of the 
people, who are repeatedly manipulated and lied to by the “system” and the media about the 
evils afflicting the country. 
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Since the National Renewal Party’s main focus is preserving the nation’s identity, its 
discourse targets the internal and external forces that it perceives to be responsible for the 
decadence plaguing the nation. This aspect is the wellspring of the party’s anti-system nature, 
its constant repudiation of Portugal’s mainstream parties, media, and cultural elites. These 
disparate and diverse elements of Portuguese society are blended into what the party 
deems “the system,” a monolithic concept composed of “the established parties, the media, 
the leftist cultural dictatorship, [and] the inhuman and multinational [forces] of capitalism” 
which thrive on using “lies and manipulation” to keep the population complacent (Zúquete 
2007a, pp. 184–185). 
 
According to Costa (2011), the National Renewal Party represents the latest development in 
the history of far-right parties in Portugal. It occupied a niche unclaimed by any other party, 
breaking with the universalist and multiracial tradition of Portuguese nationalism. The 
National Renewal Party also rejects any project that diminishes national sovereignty, 
including the European Union. Created in 2000, this party established itself as the 
Portuguese manifestation of a new lineage of nationalist-populist parties in Western Europe. 
However, as Costa notes, despite having acquired a visibility that was unprecedented among 
its predecessors in the democratic era, its performance on the electoral stage did not alter the 
marginal status of the Portuguese far right. Marchi (2012) agrees with this analysis of the 
negligible position of the National Renewal Party in Portuguese politics: 
 
[T]he PNR’s attempt to exploit the crises of post-industrial societies (mistrust of 
politics, immigration, precariousness of employment, pauperization of the middle 
class), eventually introduced the innovations of the European radical right, but this has 
yet to produce any appreciable results. (p. 107) 
 
Zúquete (2007a), Costa (2011), and Marchi (2012) place the National Renewal Party within 
the party family of European ethno-nationalist, radical-right parties including the German 
People’s Union, The Republicans (Germany), the Danish Peoples Party, the Sweden 
Democrats, Vlaams Belang (Belgium), Lega Nord (Italy) and, in particular, Front National 
(France), the most inspiring example for the National Renewal Party. In its manifesto, “the 
party stresses the primacy of security over freedom, using a populist rhetoric against the 
political system and the foundations of a participative democracy” (Costa, 2011, p. 777). It 
clearly positions itself as an anti-system party, which, given the growing dissatisfaction and 
alienation of citizens from politics (Magalhaes, 2005), could be an electoral opportunity. 
Nonetheless, after a long period of right-wing dictatorship, there is still some resistance in 
Portugal to extreme-right parties and organizations.  
 
This diffuse, cultural resistance to far-right movements and parties is an important contextual 
factor and is partly explained by the burden that was inherited from the Salazar dictatorship 
and continues to weigh down society and politics to this day. The stigma of the dictatorship is 
reflected in the Constitution (revised in 2005), which imposes some degree of illegality on 
fascist and racist organizations. Such factors have been more decisive in regard to the fate of 
the populist extreme right in Portugal than growing immigration and the economic crisis 
(Costa, 2011, p. 784).  
 
The stigmatization of populist approaches to politics has also influenced the way political 
actors have recently reacted to the economic crisis, to the constraints on national sovereignty 
imposed by the Troika’s decisions, and to the austerity measures. Apparently a fertile ground 
for anti-system parties, especially considering the discrediting of mainstream political parties, 
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these conditions have mostly produced new parties and movements whose stated objectives 
clearly show a positioning inside—not outside—the institutionalized political processes. 
LIVRE/Tempo de Avançar (FREE/Time to Move Forward), for instance, was created to 
strengthen the left against the Social Democratic Party/CDS-PP right-wing coalition and to 
facilitate potential post-electoral coalitions on the left with the Socialist Party (the 
incompatible differences between the Socialist Party, the Communist Party (PCP), and the 
Left Block (BE) are well known). 
 
Populist Actors as Communicators 
The communicative and media aspects of populism and of populist actors are rarely addressed 
in the research published in Portugal. Some studies about populist political parties and 
politicians occasionally mention some elements related to the media and communication in 
general, but these broad considerations are not further developed or supported by any 
empirical analysis. 
 
One example is Costa’s (2011) article that suggests that Jean-Marie Le Pen inspired Coelho’s 
communication strategy (the leader of the National Renewal Party); media exposure would 
lead to public visibility and more votes (p. 785). Marchi (2013) refers to this strategy in more 
detail: 
 
[T]he focus in the first few years of Pinto Coelho’s party presidency was on gaining 
publicity, with provocative actions tailor-made to attract the attention of the national 
media. … Initially, campaigns to boost the party’s media visibility did enjoy some 
success, offering the spectacle of demonstrations that were rather unusual in the 
context of the Portuguese political agenda: against Turkish membership in the 
EU, against adoptions by homosexual couples, against the decriminalization of 
abortion, against increasing levels of immigration from Brazil. (p. 139) 
 
Amateurism, a lack of strategies designed to improve communication with the public, and the 
scant charisma of the leader of the National Renewal Party, who has not been able to win the 
media’s and the public’s sympathy, are also pointed out by Marchi (2013), who explains that 
“unlike other extreme-right groupings across Europe, the PNR did not derive any added value 
from promoting its policies through its leader’s personal magnetism” (p. 140). 
 
The National Renewal Party has incorporated topics typical of other European extreme-right 
parties (anti-Islamism, anti-immigration, etc.) and  has adopted a populist language with 
strong traces of identity politics and protest. It has also tried to raise national awareness of the 
party through unconventional events in order to ensure media attention. However, despite 
its efforts, the National Renewal Party has not increased its membership and votes in a 
consequential manner. Another important explanatory factor for its lack of success so far is 
the direct competition of the more moderate right-wing CDS-PP for issues and voters. As 
Marchi (2013) explains on immigration, “the CDS-PP has managed to formulate a legalistic 
political discourse entirely devoid of racist overtones and more in tune with the general 
mood in Portugal” (p. 153). 
 
The Media and Populism 
The bibliographic search did not find any relevant references to academic publications that 
focus specifically on populism in the media or on the study of the media coverage of 
populism. In most cases, there are only mentions of the media that are not supported by 
systematic media research. The only noteworthy exception is Mendes’s research (2005), 
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which, although not entirely focused on the media, includes some description of the media 
coverage of a social movement. 
 
For the most part, Portuguese media, particularly quality newspapers and mainstream TV 
channels, are hostile toward manifestations of political populism and try to critically 
deconstruct it. The National Renewal Party, for example, like most populist political parties 
and actors, is usually covered in a negative tone, implying “an extremist group nostalgic for 
the former authoritarian regime” (Marchi, 2013, p. 150). 
 
Overall—whether in editorials, commentaries, or analyses—populism is equated with simple-
mindedness, lack of sophistication, and an overly emotional and moralistic approach to 
politics. Populism is also viewed as dangerous, leading ultimately to the weakening of 
democracy and its procedures and institutions, and favoring personalistic and plebiscitary 
political regimes. It is common for political actors in Portugal to delegitimize each 
other’s policies or proposals by labeling them populist and thus simplistic and unworthy of 
serious debate. Pundits have described populism as “the foolish hope of appealing to the 
heart” (Correia de Campos, 2014), a “terrorism of ideas” (Rangel, 2014), or “a shortcut to 
dictatorship” (Valente, 2007). 
 
Not surprisingly, the president of the Republic, the highest political authority, in his 2015 
New Year’s message to the country, decried populism as inherently threatening to the status 
quo: “I absolutely reject the demagogic and populist idea that some want to spread in public 
opinion that political parties and their officials are out of tune with the interests of the 
country” (Cavaco Silva, 2015). 
 
Mendes’s research (2004, 2005) is focused on the Canas de Senhorim popular demonstrations 
and election boycotts. This local social movement was created by the population of Canas de 
Senhorim, a civil parish in the central region of Portugal that sought the elevation of its 
locality to a municipality. Occasional conflicts lingered on for several years. Mendes 
described in detail the media coverage of these events and concluded that journalists 
did not sufficiently contextualize these popular demands; they reproduced mainly negative 
images, contributing to a negative framing of this issue and the protesters. Journalists, 
analysts, and commentators were clearly against the creation of new municipalities and 
disapproved the parliamentary discussion of this issue. In addition, they argued that any 
concession by the parliament would mean the legitimization of illegal and extreme actions. 
 
Mendes (2005) interprets these news stories and comments as reflecting a narrow vision of 
democracy of an elitist political system because, according to these journalists and 
commentators, “citizenship simply means the acceptance of parliamentary decisions.” (p. 
172). Both the media and the political elites framed the Canas de Senhorim case in a manner 
that served the interests of the established hierarchies, with the objective of restoring the 
usual order of things. This motive also explains the violence not only of the political 
authorities’ reaction but also of the police against the protesters, particularly during the 
election boycotts. 
 
If the dominant tone in the media is harsh and negative, there are also voices in the public 
sphere that criticize the demonization of populism by the mainstream political class and 
punditry. The “paranoid vigilantes of populism” are guilty of “demophobia,” or “the 
arrogance of self-enlightened elites that are contemptuous toward the voice of the people” 
(Guerreiro, 2015), while populism may well represent a “renewal of democracy in a 
8 
 
purer and more direct fashion” (Gonçalves, 2014). Mendes (2004, 2005) makes similar 
observations. 
 
Citizens and Populism 
Research on citizens and populism is also not very common. We found the two, above-
mentioned works by Mendes (2004, 2005), which are focused on the Canas de Senhorim 
social movement. In them, populism is used in the context of mobilizing civil society. 
Although Mendes’s research does not directly address the issue of effects on citizens, it deals 
with how these events were framed by the political elites and also offers a detailed descriptive 
account of the negative media coverage of these events, which may influence the manner in 
which such actors and events are perceived by citizens. 
 
Mendes’s study (2005) uses Dupuy’s Politique du Peuple (2002) as an analytical framework, 
which examines how the established elites discursively build and frame both popular 
demonstrations and the citizens who lead those demonstrations. They tend to be incorporated 
in a descriptive rather than an analytical concept of populism. Additionally, Mendes uses 
Collovald’s conceptualization of populism (2004, 2005), in which special attention is 
given to forms of conservatism and authoritarianism that are created by charismatic leaders, 
while popular mobilizations are perceived as something irrational. According to Collovald 
(2005), this re- conceptualization of populism, which initially was mainly connected to left-
wing movements, happened in the second half of the 20th century and ended up legitimizing 
the political elites while disqualifying the actions, claims, and protests of the people, the 
actual matrix of democracy (p. 225). 
 
Another subject related to citizens and populism is the citizen’s support and vote for populist 
parties. Despite some increase, the weight of the extreme right is marginal. The National 
Renewal Party gained less than 0.5% of the vote in the 2011 national parliamentary elections 
and the 2014 European parliamentary elections. In the moderate-right CDS-PP’s populist 
phase (from the early 1990s), its results were more impressive; it has been gaining between 
8% and roughly 12% of the vote in national and European parliamentary elections. 
 
Studies on the motivations and demographics of National Renewal Party voters and CDS-PP 
voters are also scarce, but Freire (2000) and Jalali (2003) noted younger voters in the CDS-PP 
electorate in the 1995 national elections as well as a decrease in its share of rural voters. And 
in the 1999 elections, the CDS-PP had better results in the counties where unemployment 
was higher (Freire, 2000). 
 
Summary and Recent Developments 
Portuguese scholarship on populism—especially in the Portuguese language about Portuguese 
case studies—is still incipient and needs further, systematic research. Although, as mentioned, 
there have been examples over time of populist actors in the country, a significant populist 
challenge to the Portuguese political establishment has yet to take place. The major political 
parties have had a strong grip on a substantial part of the electorate. Nevertheless, 
the economic crisis and the burden of austerity as well as the all-time low levels of trust in 
democracy, its institutions, and national political elites indicate a social and political climate 
that, in theory, is favorable to populist political actors, whether from the left or the right 
(European Commission, 2014). 
 
Noteworthy examples of recent developments are the new left-wing social movements and 
Marinho e Pinto, both illustrating cases of anti-elitist populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). 
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Protest movements—outside of traditional institutions and political parties—have been on the 
rise, particularly after the financial and economic crisis, and the passing of austerity measures 
by the center-right Social Democratic Party/CDS-PP coalition government. Although the 
protests have not been as successful regarding collective mobilization as some of their foreign 
counterparts, they have been part of the cycle of protests that have included the anti-austerity 
revolts in Greece, the Indignados in Spain, and the international Occupy movement 
(Estanque, Costa, & Soeiro, 2013). 
 
Several social movements—such as the 12 March Movement, or “Screw the Troika”—have 
emerged from what has come to be known as the Struggling Generation. Several dimensions 
of populism characterize these movements of social contestation: appeals to the people (who 
have been abused by the political and financial elites), polarizing rhetoric (“us” against 
“them”), anti-system rhetoric and dismissal of the traditional political elite, aversion to 
representative politics (or “politics-as-usual”), and demands for an unmediated and “real” 
democracy that reasserts popular sovereignty (which has been weakened and corrupted) at its 
essence. 
 
Although the issue will benefit from more research, the presence of these dimensions in the 
political communication of these movements—whether verbal or symbolic through the use of 
images, posters, videos, graffiti’s, and so on—justify their inclusion as an example of anti-
elitist populism (in this case progressive and left-wing) in contemporary Portugal. 
 
Although a very recent case study (thus lacking academic research underpinnings), the swift 
rise in politics and the style of Marinho e Pinto merit his inclusion as a populist actor. Even 
before entering electoral politics (in the European elections of 2014), Marinho e Pinto, as the 
president of the Portuguese Bar Association and the guest of current affairs TV shows, 
managed to promote an image of an independent, tell-it-like-it-is person who never 
minced his words about the evils of the system (whether political, economic, or judiciary) and 
to constantly further his image as someone who speaks, acts, and thinks like the people, 
sharing the people’s common sense and aversion to corruption and to the degradation of the 
nation’s moral fabric. Marinho e Pinto did all this while assailing the rest (mostly politicians, 
judges, or technocrats) for being out of touch with the people. 
 
At the age of 64, he was elected to the European Parliament, even though he ran as a 
candidate of a tiny political party—the Earth Party—which was not represented in the 
national parliament. His personal standing was immensely superior to the political party; a 
political commentator discussing on the 2014 European election results and the rise of 
populist parties in Europe accurately stated that, because of the primacy of the person 
over the party, the only candidate who ran as a “Portuguese populist” was Marinho e Pinto 
(Marques, 2014). Soon after, the newly elected representative to the European parliament cut 
his ties to the Earth Party and founded the Democratic Republican Party (PDR) to run in the 
2015 national elections. Marinho e Pinto saw the new PDR as a “people’s party that wanted 
to change the country,” and he promised to “give democracy back to the people, taking it 
away” from the “self-serving political caste” in order to “prevent the suicide of the country”: 
in short, “the new party will be a new April 25th [the date of the Portuguese democratic 
revolution] without the tanks” (Marinho e Pinto, cited in Paulo, 2014). 
 
All the while, and as another sign of anti-elitist populism, Marinho e Pinto portrays himself 
and the party as victims of the media’s hostility because they represent the only real 
challengers to the status quo: “The conspiracy of silence launched against us does not 
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demoralize us. It only shows that they are afraid” (Revez, 2015). After all, “I will make 
alliances even with the devil, if that is helpful to the people” (Lopes, 2014). It seems that the 
status of Marinho e Pinto as a self-proclaimed outsider in Portuguese politics will 
continue in the near future. 
 
To sum up, further systematic research is needed, in particular, about the impact of 
populism’s discourse both on the media and on the electorate. Empirical analysis of case-
studies will paint a fuller picture of the dynamics of populist political communication in 
contemporary Portugal. Insights from electoral and political sociology to help understand 
which social groups are more susceptible to the appeals of populist politicians and their 
motivations are also needed. Such research would also provide insights into why some 
populist actors are more successful in some countries. The inclusion of the Portuguese case 
study in cross-national comparative research would for its part develop integrated knowledge 
on the similarities and differences of various political processes and approaches to populist 
political communication. 
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